Theoretical considerations suggest that the option of waiting under conditions of uncertainty affects the relative importance of firm-level productivity and distance-related transaction costs as driving forces of FDI. Yet the timing of FDI has received little attention in the empirical literature on FDI determinants. To help close this gap we analyze FDI decisions by German firms with and without affiliates in the Czech Republic at different stages of transition. We find that FDI entry strongly depends on firm productivity immediately after the political and economic regime change, but less so with diminishing uncertainty. Likewise, distance-related transaction costs discourage FDI by latecomers considerably less than FDI by early movers.
Introduction
Investments are largely irreversible as sunk costs cannot be recovered. This is why firms may delay investment decisions until uncertainty is sufficiently reduced (Pindyck 1991) . With the option value of waiting being firmly established in the theory of investment, it is all the more surprising that the empirical literature on the driving forces of foreign direct investment (FDI) has paid little attention to issues of timing. It is still true that most analyses focus on the "who", "why" and "where" of FDI, while ignoring the question of "when" (Rivoli and Salorio 1996) .
Timing is obviously relevant for firms facing a trade-off when deciding on FDI. On the one hand, uncertainty provides incentives to postpone FDI entry decisions, notably in potential host countries having undergone major political changes and economic reforms. On the other hand, entering earlier than rivals offers monopoly status until latecomers follow (Lin and Saggi 2002) . For instance, Luo (1998) finds that early entrants in China have outperformed followers in terms of gaining local market shares.
Transition countries in Central and Eastern Europe provide a case in point with respect
to the risk and opportunity that early entrants faced after the regime change in the early 1990s.
At the same time, the "when" of FDI is of crucial importance to the host countries. Transition countries may have particularly strong incentives to "induce firms to relinquish the option [of waiting] and move forward with investment" (Rivoli and Salorio 1996: 352) . Early movers bringing in FDI help overcome transition crises such as those experienced in Central and Eastern Europe.
Against this background, we employ firm-level data to assess the determinants of German FDI after the collapse of the communist regime in the Czech Republic. The focus is on the importance of firm productivity and distance to the foreign (Czech) location for FDI decisions by early movers, followers and latecomers among German parent firms, compared to a control group without FDI in the Czech Republic. Employing two-step Heckman models, we find that FDI entry strongly depends on firm productivity in the first phase of transition, but less so with diminishing uncertainty about its future course. Likewise, distance-related transaction costs discourage FDI by latecomers considerably less than FDI by early movers.
Major determinants of entry under uncertainty: Analytical background
Economic and political risk are widely considered in cross-country and panel analyses of the determinants of FDI (e.g., Schneider and Frey 1985; Gastanaga et al. 1998; Chakrabarti 2001 ). However, this strand of the literature focuses on where, rather than when FDI is undertaken. For instance, it has often been shown that politically unstable host countries receive less FDI. By contrast, some earlier studies explicitly address the issue of optimal timing of FDI. Buckley and Casson (1981) provide a notable example. They model the switch to FDI depending on the cost structures of alternative modes of servicing foreign markets and local market development in the host country. In particular, Buckley and Casson (1981) show that the switch is postponed once FDI-related sunk costs are taken into account. They also note that familiarisation with foreign markets tends to reduce costs over time. They assume,
however, that the costs of doing business abroad decline for all modes in the same way so that the timing of the switch to FDI is unaffected.
FDI-specific uncertainty is at the centre of some recent models on the timing of FDI decisions by heterogeneous firms. Buckley and Casson (1981) , this development is FDI-specific as uncertainty is reduced by the diffusion of new information coming from first movers among foreign investors. The argument that previous FDI creates positive externalities for followers is also underlying the model of Lin and Saggi (2002) . Consequently, "each potential entrant faces a trade-off between entering earlier than its rivals and enjoying monopoly status until additional entry occurs versus waiting and entering later in order to lower entry costs" (Lin and Saggi 2002: 211) .
This trade-off challenges some widely held views on the driving forces of FDI. In particular, the role of firm-level productivity and distance need to be reconsidered as their importance may depend on the timing of FDI. According to Helpman et al. (2004: 300) , "of those firms that serve foreign markets, only the most productive engage in FDI." The productivity of parent firms must be sufficiently high to bear the extra fixed costs of establishing affiliates in foreign markets. While this reasoning is widely accepted by now, it has to be refined once the "when" of FDI is taken into account. In Chang and Lu's (2009) model, the introduction of risk has the effect that the relationship between firm productivity and FDI becomes non-monotonic. Firms with intermediate productivity levels are more likely to undertake FDI than the most (and the least) productive firms. Similarly, Rivoli and Salorio (1996) argue that strong ownership advantages, typically supposed to render FDI more likely, may actually delay FDI. The larger the competitive edge a firm has over its competitors, the longer it can afford to wait for new information to reduce uncertainty. By contrast, the sequence of entry derived by Lin and Saggi (2002) is more in line with the conventional view:
More cost efficient firms are likely to enter first, even though the model emphasizes trade-offs of early entry.
Apart from the timing of FDI entry, the trade-off between the profit opportunities and sunk costs of early entry may also affect the size of FDI as long as uncertainty is high. (Luo 1998) .
Previous empirical evidence largely corroborates the view that more productive firms are more likely to undertake FDI (e.g., Raff et al. 2008; 2009 […] and a tremendous amount of uncertainty" go often hand in hand (Luo 1998: 392) . Hence, the subsequent analysis of German FDI in the Czech Republic may help close important empirical gaps by comparing the importance of firm-level productivity for FDI decisions during different phases of economic transition.
New insights are also expected on the role of distance when taking the timing of FDI into account. The impact of distance on FDI is theoretically ambiguous (e.g., Markusen and Maskus 2002) . On the one hand, FDI-related management and transaction costs increase with greater distance between the home and the host country of FDI. On the other hand, remote markets might be served at lower cost through local production than through exports from the home base. Empirical investigations "equivocally report a negative distance parameter" (Egger and Pfaffermayr 2004: 240) FDI by followers when an increasing number of early movers reveal more information on remote locations. The self-reinforcing character of FDI entry decisions let us expect that the discouraging effect of distance weakens over time. This should apply at least as long as FDIrelated uncertainty looms large, which is most likely to be the case in developing and transition countries having undergone major political and economic upheaval.
Data and method
We combine two firm-specific datasets to assess the determinants of German company The second source, the online database of Hoppenstedt (2009), a commercial data provider, contains company profiles of German firms with more than ten employees or annual sales of more than one million €, including most of the parent firms with FDI in the Czech Republic. We use these company profiles to obtain information on the German parent firms, including (major and minor) line(s) of business (NACE industry codes), annual sales, number of employees, and number of foreign affiliates.
Furthermore, we use Hoppenstedt's online database to construct a control group of German companies without affiliates in the Czech Republic. The number of firms in the control group closely resembles the number of firms in the FDI group. The control group has been selected randomly from the universe of about 250,000 German firms listed by
Hoppenstedt. More precisely, the control group principally consists of every 200 th entry in this alphabetically ordered database. 4 The list of variables collected for the control group is exactly the same as for the sample of German parent companies with FDI in the Czech
Republic.
In our empirical analysis we model the FDI decision of German firms as a two-step problem. 5 First, firms decide whether or not to invest in the Czech Republic. This zero/one decision is supposed to depend on firm (i) and industry (j) characteristics,
Equation (1) is estimated using data for the German investors as well as the control group. For those firms that do invest in the Czech Republic, we can then also model the choice of the size of the foreign affiliate,
where FdiSize is the number of employees employed in the Czech affiliate of firm i.
This model is estimated using the Heckman (1979) two-step procedure. X i denotes a vector of firm characteristics, and Z j a vector of industry characteristics. The parameter λ i in equation (2) captures the probability of firm i being observed in this second step (inverted Mills ratio in Heckman's parlance) and v i is the remaining error term. Equation (1) 
includes
ExV i as an exclusion variable to aid identification (see below).
Vector X i comprises the size of the German parent firm (measured in terms of employment), its productivity (measured as labour productivity), the number of foreign affiliates (reflecting the parent's experience with foreign operations), and the degree of diversification. As noted above, the parent firm's productivity (lnProductivity) figures prominently as a determinant of FDI decisions in the recent literature on firm heterogeneity.
frequently been identified as determining the propensity to produce outside the home country" (Kravis and Lipsey 1982: 203) . Again in line with earlier studies, previous experience with foreign operations (#ForAffiliates) is supposed to affect current FDI decisions, even though the effect may not be strictly positive if the sample largely consists of relatively small parent firms that tend to be constrained financially. The number of industries in which the parent firm is active (#NaceCodes) is our proxy for the degree of diversification.
The firm-specific variables X i are complemented by variables Z j at the industry level.
We include a proxy for skill intensity as well as a measure of market structure. 6 The impact of skill intensity (lnIndSkiInt) on FDI decisions is theoretically ambiguous. Skills may reflect higher productivity at the industry level and, thus, increase the likelihood of FDI. However, skill intensive industries may also have weaker incentives and less pressure to undertake (vertical) FDI to save costs. 7 Market structure (lnIndCom) is measured by the number of firms per 1,000 € of value added in an industry.
Finally, we consider geographical distance as our exclusion variable, ExV i , affecting the selection in equation (1) (1) and (2).
Summary statistics are presented in Appendix A2. As can be seen, German parent firms in the FDI group are considerably larger than firms in the control group. At the same time, the experience with foreign operations (#ForAffiliates) differs significantly between both groups. By contrast, differences in productivity and the degree of diversification (#NaceCodes) appear to be minor. Over the whole period of observation, the average distance between the location of the German parents and their Czech affiliates is just about 40 kilometres less than the average of the hypothetical distances calculated for firms in the control group.
As noted before, we are mainly interested in whether the relevance of firm-level productivity and distance-related transaction costs for FDI decisions varies over time. More precisely, we differentiate between three sub-periods in the following: 1990-1993, 1994-1999, and 2000-2007 
Empirical results
In columns (1) and (2) of Table 1 we report the estimation results for the overall sample of German affiliates in the Czech Republic, irrespective of the time of entry, plus the control group without FDI. While both industry variables are statistically insignificant, the baseline findings on firm-specific variables are mostly as expected. In particular, larger and more productive German parents are more likely to undertake FDI in the Czech Republic (column 1). At the same time, German parents with these characteristics tend to establish larger Czech affiliates in the second step (column 2). Selection into the FDI group also depends positively on previous experience of parent companies, measured by the number of foreign affiliates.
The insignificant correlation of #ForAffiliates with the size of FDI in the second step may be due to financial constraints of German parent firms.
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The degree of diversification enters significantly positive in the selection equation.
This is in contrast to earlier studies finding that more diversified parent firms are less likely to select FDI (Görg et al. 2009 ). The relatively large number of diversified parents in the services sector among German firms with FDI in the Czech Republic provides a possible explanation. 12 The exclusion variable, distance, enters significantly negative at the one per cent level. The coefficient of lnDistance implies that increasing the distance between the German parent and the Czech affiliate by some 40 kilometres from the mean distance of about 380 kilometres reduces the probability of observing the firm in the FDI group by 6.8 per cent.
When also included in the second step of deciding on the size of FDI, the distance variable turned out to be completely insignificant and the coefficients of all other variables remained as before (not shown). Turning to the FDI determinants that are of principal interest in the present context, we find strong evidence that timing matters for the relative importance of both firm productivity and distance. The results on firm-level productivity for selecting FDI are in conflict with the hypothesis advanced by Rivoli and Salorio (1996) as well as Chang and Lu (2009) However, we do find some indications of a non-monotonic relationship between firm productivity and FDI in the second step of deciding on the size of FDI projects. The insignificant coefficient of lnProductivity in column (4) of Table 1 may suggest that productive early movers among German parents tested the waters during the first years of transition, but were no more inclined than less productive peers to risk high sunk costs under conditions of considerable uncertainty. This tends to support the reasoning that early movers may mitigate the trade-off between profit opportunities and sunk costs by limiting their engagement to relatively small FDI projects (Luo 1998) . The positive correlation between firm productivity and the size of FDI found before for the overall sample is attributable exclusively to the sub-sample of followers in 1994-1999. The sustainability of transition was beyond serious doubt at this time so that more productive firms opted for larger affiliates.
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Using distance as an exclusion variable is justified not only for the overall sample but also for the three sub-samples. Distance enters significantly negative in all selection equations, whereas it proved irrelevant as a determinant of the size of FDI by early movers, followers as well as latecomers in additional (unreported) estimations. All the same, the relative importance of distance for self-selection of German parents with affiliates in the Czech Republic varies depending on FDI timing. The discouraging effect of a larger distance between the locations of the German parent and the Czech affiliate is clearly strongest immediately after the political and economic regime change. In the first phase of transition, the negative coefficient of lnDistance is more than twice as large as in the most recent past when the Czech Republic became a full EU member.
As explained in more detail in Section 3, we had to construct a hypothetical distance measure for the control group of German firms without affiliates in the Czech Republic. In order to check the sensitivity of our estimation results to the treatment of distance-related transaction costs, we replace lnDistance by a simple dummy variable. DumBS is set equal to one for the two German federal states sharing a common border with the Czech Republic, Bavaria and Saxony. Results of this robustness test are reported in Table 2 .
Apart from the proxy of transaction costs, all other results are essentially the same as before in Table 1 . In particular, previous findings on the importance of firm-level productivity for the sub-samples of early movers, followers and latecomers are not affected by the change in accounting for transaction costs. There are just some minor changes in the level of significance. Most notably, the positive coefficient of the skill intensity at the industry level, lnIndSkiInt, now just passes the ten per cent level of significance in the equation with FDI size for followers (column 4 in Table 2 ).
It also remains that the German parents' geographical closeness to Czech locations was most important for early movers to self-select into the FDI group during the first phase of transition. By setting the dummy variable equal to one for neighbouring Bavaria and Saxony, its positive coefficient implies that FDI from more distant federal states was discouraged by higher transaction costs. The difference in the size of the coefficient of the dummy variable between the first and subsequent phases of transition in Table 2 is comparable to, though slightly less pronounced than the corresponding difference for the distance variable in Table   1 .
Summary and conclusion
Theoretical considerations suggest that the option of waiting under conditions of uncertainty affects the relative importance of firm-level productivity and distance-related transaction costs as driving forces of FDI. and the subsequent liberalization programme), and Sub-Sahara Africa (for large parts of which foreign investors may still lack reliable information on opportunities and risks). From the perspective of host countries, it is obviously relevant to induce foreign investors to forgo the option of waiting (see also Rivoli and Salorio 1996) . However, it is less clear how to reduce uncertainty and which policy options are most effective in bringing FDI forward. Arguably, it is not only the depth and speed of reforms that matters for attracting more FDI from early movers, but also the credibility of local institutions and binding character of economic policy. For instance, bilateral investment treaties and trade agreements may be more effective in reducing uncertainty and luring early movers, compared to unilateral liberalization measures, even if mutually binding FDI provisions are less far-reaching.
Ultimately, host countries considering policy options may face a trade-off similar to the trade- Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All regressions include three-digit industry dummies.
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